Criminal Procedure - An Expansion of the Automobile Exception Rule to the Warrant Requirement of the Fourth Amendment - California v. Carney by Hall, C. Joyce
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 6 
Issue 2 Vol. 6 Iss. 2 Article 5 
1986 
Criminal Procedure - An Expansion of the Automobile Exception 
Rule to the Warrant Requirement of the Fourth Amendment - 
California v. Carney 
C. Joyce Hall 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
6 Miss. C. L. Rev. 173 (1985-1986) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - An Expansion of the "Automobile
Exception" Rule to the Warrant Requirement of the Fourth
Amendment - California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
FACTS
A Dodge Mini Motor Home parked in a lot in downtown San
Diego came under surveillance when Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration agent Robert Williams observed Charles Carney approach
a youth and enter the motor home. Carney closed the window
shades and remained inside with the youth for an hour and fifteen
minutes. Previously, Williams had received uncorroborated evi-
dence that the motor home was being used by persons exchang-
ing marihuana for sex. When the youth exited the motor home,
the agents stopped and questioned him. The youth admitted to
the agents that he had received marihuana for sexual contacts with
Carney.
The agents requested that the youth return to the motor home
and knock on the door. When Carney stepped out, the agents iden-
tified themselves. Without a warrant or consent from Carney, one
agent entered the motor home. Observing marihuana, plastic bags,
and scales, the agent took Carney into custody and Williams took
possession of the motor home. Later the police searched the ve-
hicle at the police station. They discovered additional marihuana
in the cupboards and refrigerator.
Carney was charged with possession of marihuana for sale.'
At the preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the evidence
obtained from the motor home. The magistrate denied the mo-
tion, holding that the initial search was justified as a search for
other persons and the subsequent search at the police station was
justified as a routine inventory search.
The superior court also denied Carney's motion. In upholding
the search, the court explained that the search of the motor home
came within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
of the fourth amendment. They further held that the motor home
could be seized as an instrumentality of the crime.'
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court
under a similar reasoning, holding that the automobile exception
applied to the search of the motor home.' However, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed the decision, rejecting the extension
of the vehicle exception to motor homes. They stated that the ex-
1. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 388 (1985).
2. Id. at 388-98. Following the Superior Court's holding, Carney pleaded nolo contendere to the charges
and was placed on probation for three years.
3. Id. at 389.
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pectation of privacy in a motor home is more like that in a dwell-
ing than in an automobile because the motor home primarily
functions as living quarters, not transportation.' The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motor home, in this
case, fell clearly within the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement of the fourth amendment.'
BACKGROUND OF THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.'
The historical basis for this amendment is rooted in the strug-
gle before and during the War for Independence when the colonists
rebelled against intrusions by the British into their homes.7 The
purpose of the amendment is to provide a safeguard for the privacy
of individuals against arbitrary invasion from government offi-
cials.' Therefore, the general rule is that searches of private
property without a warrant are unreasonable. 9
The Supreme Court has established certain exceptions to the
general rule requiring a warrant to search private property." The
first major exception allows a warrantless search incident to a law-
4. Id. That court reached its decision by concluding that the mobility of a vehicle 'is no longer the prime
justification for the automobile exception'; rather, 'the answer lies in the diminished expectation of privacy
which surrounds the automobile.'" Id. (Quoting the California Supreme Court opinion at 34 Cal. 3d 597, 605,
668 P.2d 807, 811, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500, 504 (1983)).
5. Id.
6. U. S. CONST. amend, IV.
7. During the colonial period, revenue officers were issued writs of assistance enabling them, in their dis-
cretion, "to search suspected places for smuggled goods." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1885).
This practice was condemned as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power,'" because it "placed 'the liberty
of every man in the hands of every petty officer.'" .Id at 625. England was undergoing a similar struggle dur-
ing the same period. General warrants were issued by the secretary of state for searches of private homes to
search for and seize books and papers that might be libelous. In Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials
1029, Lord Camden pronounced this action as trespass. The judgment was celebrated in the colonies. Boyd,
116 U.S. at 626. Resistance to these practices is the foundation of the fourth amendment and the principle
that "a man's house is his castle and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods
and papers." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1913). See also Stengel, The Background of the
Fourth Amendment To The Constitution of the United States, Part One, 3 U. RICH. L. REv. 278, 293-96 (t969);
D. HUTCHISON, THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 293-98 (1975); SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 304-06,
427 (R. Perry ed. 1959).
8. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
9. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S 433 (1973). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
10. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1
(1978).
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ful arrest. Only the area within the arrestee's immediate control
may be searched. The justification for this exception is to enable
the arresting officer to search and seize any nearby weapons or
destructible evidence.11 A second exception allows a warrantless
search based on voluntary consent. Here, the warrant require-
ment is waived by the individual.12 The presence of exigent cir-
cumstances is a third justification for dispensing with the
requirement of a warrant. It has been stated that all exceptions
to the warrant requirement involve exigent circumstances because
some event or condition overrides the necessity of the warrant.
The fourth major exception is the one discussed in Carney - the
automobile exception."4
The automobile exception to the general rule requiring war-
rants was carefully delineated by the Court in 1925 in Carroll
v. United States. " This prohibition-era case involved a search and
seizure by federal agents of a car travelling on a public highway.
The agents had firsthand information that the car was being used
to transport whiskey in violation of the National Prohibition Act. 6
In a landmark decision, the Court distinguished automobiles from
"other structures" for purposes of the fourth amendment.
ITihe guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been
construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference be-
tween a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant
readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods,
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
I1. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (The Court allowed a warrantless search only of the area
within the arrestee's immediate control, hence overruling United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
which permitted the police to search an entire room as incident to the occupant's arrest.).
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.22 (1967) (The Court recognized that a search based on
consent was valid.). The consent must be given voluntarily. Voluntariness is decided on the totality of the cir-
cumstances involved. However, knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not a prerequisite to voluntary
consent, and no warnings need be given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
13. J. HALL, JR. SEARCH AND SEIZURE 199-200 (1982).
14. Two other exceptions used by the courts to justify a warrantless search include the stop and frisk doc-
trine upheld by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968), allowing a limited stop and frisk
of a suspect on a street encounter under reasonable suspicion that he was armed. The other exception is the
plain view doctrine, which allows an area in plain view of the observer to be searched without a warrant provided
the initial intrusion by the officer which brings him into plain view of the evidence is legal and it is "immediate-
ly apparent" by the officer that the object in plain view is evidence of a crime. This doctrine is discussed in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
15. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
16. Id. at 134. It has been noted that the National Probition Act required a warrant in older le tsearch a
private home for illegal whiskey but this restriction was not imposed on searches of moving objects such as
an automobile. Therefore, the Court developed the exception around this "mobility concept" by interpreting
a statute. However, in the cases following Carroll, warrantless searches were upheld by simply citing Carroll.
This occurred even when statutory authorization was absent. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). See generally Miles & Wefing, The Automobile Search and
the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 105, 112 (1972).
17. 267 U.S. at 153.
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Emphasis was placed on the quality of the car as "quickly mov-
able." The Court cautioned that persons lawfully within this coun-
try have a right to free passage on the highways unless a competent
official has probable cause for believing their vehicle is transport-
ing contraband.18 Probable cause was defined as "a reasonable
ground for belief in guilt."19 This standard implied more than good
faith.2" Given probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains
contraband, the Court said that the police have the authority to
search it without a warrant whether or not an arrest is made based
on the fact that the vehicle can be quickly moved.21 The Court
appeared to qualify the exception by saying that where it is prac-
ticable to obtain a warrant, one must be obtained; otherwise the
officer operates at his peril if he proceeds without a warrant and
cannot show probable cause for the search.2" Because an automo-
bile is "quickly movable," it is often impracticable to obtain a war-
rant. The Court held that the agents had probable cause to search
the car; therefore, a warrant was not required and the contraband
found as a result of the search was admissible evidence at trial.23
The next major automobile search case did not come before
the Court until thirty-nine years after Carroll. Citing Carroll, the
Supreme Court in Preston v. United States24 held a warrantless
search of an automobile unreasonable because the search was too
remote in time and place from the arrest of the occupants .2 Three
men were arrested for vagrancy. After the arrest, their car was
towed to a garage and subsequently searched by police officers.
Items normally used to commit a robbery were found and one
of the men confessed to an intended bank robbery. The evidence
was introduced at trial over petitioner's objections and the three
men were convicted of conspiracy to rob a bank. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that searches of motorcars must be
reasonable before evidence obtained will be admissible at trial.
However, they said that "what may be an unreasonable search
of a house may be reasonable in the case of a motorcar." 2 A war-
rantless search of an automobile incident to a lawful arrest is
18. Id. at 154.
19. Id. at 161 citing McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. St. 63 (1881).
20. Id. at 161. See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)(A warrantless search cannot be
at the whim of the police.).
21. 267 U.S. at 153.
22. Id. at 156.
23. Id. at 162.
24. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
25. Id. at 368.
26. Id. at 366-67. ("Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving searches of motorcars or
other things readily moved cannot be treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures
like houses."). Id.
[Vol. 6:173
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reasonable, but the Court noted under the facts in Preston that
this justification is absent where the search is remote in time or
place from the arrest.27
Preston was distinguished on its facts, however, in Cooper v.
California.28 Cooper was convicted of selling heroin to a police
informant based on evidence seized, without a warrant, from the
glove compartment of Cooper's car which police impounded af-
ter his arrest. The Court distinguished Preston in that it involved
a search incident to a valid arrest.29 In Cooper, the Court con-
cluded that the search after the car was impounded was reasona-
ble to look for evidence of the crime for which Cooper was
arrested. Therefore, unlike the search in Preston, the subsequent
search in Cooper was closely related to the reason Cooper was
arrested."0 Although the majority found Preston not to be applica-
ble, the minority held Cooper to be on all fours with Preston and
considered the warrantless search unreasonable. 1
The distinguishing factor between the above cited cases is that
in Preston, the search was found to be unreasonable on the basis
of a search incident to arrest. To be reasonable, a search incident
to arrest must be made at the time of the arrest and includes a
search of only the area within the arrestee's immediate control."
In Carroll and Cooper, however, the search was held reasonable
on the basis of probable cause. The searching officer in both cases
had probable cause to believe that the area searched contained
contraband."
In Chambers v. Maroney, " the Court carried the Cooper hold-
ing one step further by justifying a warrantless search of an au-
tomobile at the police station after an arrest had been made in
another location. The Court again distinguished Preston on the
basis that the arrest was for vagrancy; therefore, there was no
27. Id at 367. Preston was decided solely on the "search incident to arrest" exception to the warrant require-
ment. See supra note I t and accompanying text. The Court distinguished Carroll on the basis that in Preston
the defendants were under arrest at the police station and the car was in police custody at the garage, so there
was no danger that the car would be moved our of their jurisdiction.
28. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
29. Id. at 59-60. Alternatively it was argued that the search was justified because the police had probable
cause to believe the car was stolen. However, the arrest was for vagrancy, not theft, so the police had no authority
to hold his car on that charge. Therefore, even though the police impounded his car, it was as though it was
in the defendant's own or his agent's possession. Id. at 60,
30. Id. at 61. ("The fact that the police had custody of Preston's car was totally unrelated to the vagrancy
charge for which they arrested him."). Id.
31. id. at 65. ("[I]n each, [Preston and Cooper] the search was of a car 'validly' held by officers." Justice
Douglas suggests that Cooper overrules Preston sub silentio). Id.
32. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
33. See supra text accompanying notes 15 and 21.
34. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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probable cause to believe the car contained evidence of a crime."
The Court held that there was constitutionally no difference be-
tween an immediate warrantless search of an automobile upon
probable cause and the warrantless seizure and detention of an
automobile until the probable cause issue could be presented be-
fore a magistrate. 6 Justice Harlan, dissenting, noted that the
majority had "discardted] the approach taken in Preston, and
creat[ed] a special rule for automobile searches that is seriously
at odds with generally applied Fourth Amendment principles." 7
The Court applied Chambers to the facts in Texas v. White. 8
They held that where the police officers had probable cause to
search the car at the scene, they could constitutionally search it
later at the station without a warrant, because the probable cause
factor was still present at the station. 9 This means that no other
exigent circumstances are necessary to justify a warrantless search
at the police station if the automobile exception applies at the scene.
Justice Marshall, dissenting, said that the majority holding was
a misstatement of Chambers."0 He construed Chambers to hold
that it was constitutionally permissible to conduct a warrantless
search at the station only when it was reasonable to take the car
there in the first place.1 He distinguished Chambers from the case
at bar on the the basis that in Chambers the occupants of the car
were arrested in a dark parking lot where it was not practical or
safe for the officers to conduct a search."2 In the present case,
White was arrested in the early afternoon when it was practical
and safe to conduct the search immediately." Justice Marshall
saw no justification for extending Chambers in this way."
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,5 the Court stressed the require-
ment that exigent circumstances must exist before an officer is
35. Id. at 47. The Court noted that the search could not be justified on the basis of a search incident to
arrest because the search took place at the police station. However, there are alternative grounds to justify
the search-probable cause.
36. Id. at 52. ("Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.").
Id.
37. Id. at 65.
38. 423 U.S. 67 (1975). White was arrested for passing fraudulent checks. The police asked him to pull
his car over to the curb. When he parked, a bank employee saw him stuff something between the seats. The
officers requested consent to search his car but he refused. They searched it anyway. Four wrinkled checks
were discovered and admitted as evidence at trial.
39. Id. at 68.
40. Id. at 69 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 70.
43. ld.
44. Id. at 72.
45. 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 6:173
1986] FOURTH AMENDMENT - AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION 179
justified in conducting a warrantless search of an automobile."'
The facts in Coolidge differed from the previous automobile ex-
ception cases the Supreme Court had decided. Unlike in Carroll,
Cooper, and Chambers, the car searched was parked in the sus-
pect's driveway and not moving on the highway. 7 Nothing indi-
cated that the car would be fleeting or that objects inside would
be destroyed because the owner was being arrested." The search
could not be justified as one incident to arrest because the arrestee
was in his house, where the only justified warrantless search would
have been the area in his immediate control or possession. 9 There-
fore, the Court refused to extend Carroll to permit a warrantless
search of an unoccupied vehicle on private property and beyond
the scope of a valid search incident to arrest."° There were no
exigent circumstances to warrant this search. They cautioned that
"[tihe word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away. " "
In Cady v. Dombrowski, 2 the Court confronted a similar situ-
ation to that found in Coolidge. Here, the Court upheld a war-
rantless search of a vehicle on private property on the justification
that the search was pursuant to standard police procedures." The
respondent, a Chicago police officer, was involved in a one-car
accident as a result of drunken driving. He was arrested and then
taken to the hospital. The officers had his car towed to a private
garage. After learning that Dombrowski was a police officer and
failing to find his revolver on his person, the officers drove to
the garage for the purpose of looking for the revolver. This, the
officer testified, was standard procedure to insure the public's safe-
ty-" Upon opening the trunk, the officer found moist blood on
several items. He took the items to the police station and con-
fronted the respondent. At trial, this evidence was used to prove
that the respondent was responsible for the murder of a body found
on the respondent's brother's farm. 5 The Court stressed the stan-
dard of reasonableness set forth in the fourth amendment, but noted
46. Id. at 468. ("[N]o amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent 'exigent
circumstances.' "). Id.
47. Id. at 458.
48. Id. at 460. Furthermore, the objects in the car were not stolen, contraband, or dangerous. Id.
49. Id. at 455-57. See supra note II and accompanying text.
50. Id. at 461 n.18.
51. Id. at 461.
52. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
53. Id. at 443. The Court again read Preston narrowly as standing for the proposition that a search away
from the scene cannot be justified as a search incident to arrest. However, other justifications might apply.
Id. at 444.
54. Id. at 437.
55. ld. at 436-38. The state's case was based solely on circumstantial evidence, as the Court points out.
Id. at 439.
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the constitutional difference between cars and homes.5" They also
expressed the difference in the type of contact state and local offi-
cials have in regulating automobiles on the highways as opposed
to the contact federal agents have, which is usually connected to
some type of criminal investigation. 7 The Court said that it was
reasonable for the officer to believe the trunk contained a gun.58
Therefore, they held the warrantless search reasonable on the basis
that it was standard police procedure to protect the public and
it had taken place on private property by the police who ordered
it towed.5 9
The routine-procedure justification in Cady was extended to in-
ventory searches in South Dakota v. Opperman." Here, police
impounded an illegally parked car that had been ticketed twice,
and searched it in order to inventory the items in the car. The
search included opening the unlocked glove compartment where-
upon marihuana was found. When the owner came to claim his
property, he was arrested for possession of marihuana. 1 The Court
held the search, including the search of the glove compartment,
reasonable as a standard routine procedure since that is the cus-
tomary place to keep documents of ownership and registration. "'
The Court noted three reasons justifying the need for inventory
searches: "the protection of the owner's property while it remains
in police custody, the protection of the police against claims or
disputes over lost or stolen property, and the protection of the
police from potential danger."" Furthermore, the Court empha-
sized that the issue of probable cause is not relevant to routine
inventory searches, because the probable cause inquiry is only
related to criminal investigations, not routine inventories." There-
fore, inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are
reasonable for purposes of the fourth amendment. 6 A strong dis-
senting opinion objected to holding the search of the closed com-
partment reasonable because there was no reason to believe it
contained any valuable property. 6
56. Id. at 439-440.
57. Id. at 441. State and local officials, more often than federal officials, perform "community caretaking
functions." Id. That was the initial function performed by the police officers in this case; they towed Dom-
browski's car because it was in the way of traffic on the highway. Id. at 443.
58. Id. at 448.
59. Id.
60. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
61. Id. at 365-66.
62. Id. at 372.
63. Id. at 369. These needs are denominated "caretaking functions" of the police. Id. at 368.
64. Id. at 370 n.5.
65. ld. at 383.
66. Id. at 394 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall argued that absent consent to search, a routine inventory
search conducted without a warrant may only be upheld upon the fulfillment of two requirements: (1) that
[Vol. 6:173
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In Cardwell v. Lewis, 61 the Court stressed the "lesser expecta-
tion of privacy" present in a car to justify a warrantless search
of the exterior of Lewis' car."8 Lewis was arrested for murder.
The police impounded his car and searched the exterior to com-
pare tire impressions and paint particles made at the scene of the
crime."9 In upholding the action by the police, the Court stated
in dictum that
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects . . . . It travels public thorough-
fares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view. . . . This is not to say that no part of
the interior of an automobile has Fourth Amendment protection; the exercise of a desire to be mobile does
not, of course, waive one's right to be free of unreasonable government intrusion."0
Here, only the exterior part of the vehicle was "searched" where
there was no expectation of privacy; therefore, there was no search
for purposes of the fourth amendment. 1
The scope of a warrantless search was a continuing problem
for courts and law enforcement officials throughout the develop-
ment of the automobile exception rule, especially as to closed con-
tainers found during the search. In Robbins v. California,"2 a
plurality opinion, it was held that closed, opaque containers are
fully protected by the fourth amendment whether found in a car
or anywhere else because the owner has a greater expectation of
privacy in its contents.73 The only exceptions to this rule are when
the contents are in plain view or when the contents can be in-
ferred from its outward appearance.7" Therefore, the Supreme
Court held that evidence found when Robbins' car was lawfully
searched was inadmissible because the officer wrongfully opened
a closed package found in the luggage compartment." However,
in New York v. Belton," decided the same day, the Court upheld
a warrantless search of containers in an automobile on the justifi-
cation that it was incident to a lawful arrest."' Here, police stopped
the search be necessary to protect the integrity of the particular valuable property impounded, and (2) even
when the search is appropriate, that it be conducted only after reasonable attempts have been made to identify
and reach the owner of the property. Marshall believed that neither of these standards was met in this case,
so the search was unreasonable.
67. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
68. Id. at 590.
69. Id. at 584.
70. Id. at 590-591. The Court noted that the right to privacy is the "touchstone of our inquiry" in fourth
amendment analysis of the protection of automobiles. id. at 591.
71. Id. at 591.
72. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 426-28. See supra note 14 regarding the plain view doctrine.
75. ld. at 428. The package was not in plain view nor could the contents be inferred from its outward ap-
pearance. See supra text accompanying note 74.
76. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
77. Id. at 460.
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and arrested occupants of a car for unlawful possession of mari-
huana. The officer first ordered all of the occupants out of the
car. After searching the occupants, the officer proceeded to search
the passenger compartment. In the back seat, he dis-
covered cocaine in the pocket of Belton's jacket.78 The Court stated,
[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile,
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartnent of that automobile.
It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the contents of any containers found
within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so
also will containers in it be within his reach.... Such a container may, of course, be searched whether
it is open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest
in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the
arrestee may have."
The next year, the Court rejected the result in Robbins. In United
States v. Ross, 0 the Court settled the issue of the scope of a war-
rantless search of closed containers in a vehicle when the war-
rantless search is based on probable cause."1 A detective received
a call from an informant describing a suspect and his car which
were involved in the sale of narcotics. Police officers discovered
the car matching the informant's description and pulled it over.
The officers searched the interior of the car and found a pistol
in the glove compartment. After arresting and handcuffing Ross,
the driver of the vehicle, one of the officers took Ross' keys and
opened the trunk. He found a closed brown paper bag containing
glassine bags of white powder.8" The car was taken to the police
station and searched again. This time a search of the trunk
produced a zippered red leather pouch holding $3,200.00 in cash.
Ross was charged and later convicted of possession of heroin.8
The Court considered the question of whether the warrantless
search of the containers was reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment.8 In holding the search reasonable because it was based on
probable cause to search the vehicle, the Court stated that, "[t]he
scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no
narrower - and no broader - than the scope of a search authorized
by a warrant supported by probable cause. Only the prior approval
of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise is as the magis-
trate could authorize."" The Court further illustrated the scope
of the search as being defined by the object of the search, not
78. Id. at 46.
79. Id. at 460-61.
80. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
81. id.
82. The powder was later determined by a police laboratory to be heroin. Id. at 801.
83. Id. at 798.
84. Id. at 800-01.
85. Id. at 823.
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the nature of the container.86 Justice Powell's concurring opinion
praised the majority opinion for giving guidance to this recurring
situation.' However, Justice Marshall, dissenting, attacked the
majority by saying that "it repeals the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement itself.""' He viewed the majority's opinion as es-
tablishing a new "probable cause" exception without regard to the
two considerations which originally justified the automobile ex-
ception: 1) mobility of the vehicle; and 2) diminished expecta-
tion of privacy in an automobile, neither of which he found in
the Court's justification for its holding on closed containers found
in an automobile."
Finally, in United States v. Johns,90 the Court considered the
issue of whether a warrantless search of a vehicle and containers
therein which is reasonable if searched immediately is also reasonable
if searched three days later. 9 Customs officials had probable cause
to search two pickup trucks believed to be involved in drug smug-
gling. ' After arresting the occupants of the trucks, officials drove
the trucks to the Drug Enforcement Administration headquar-
ters, where they were searched three days later." The Court up-
held the search, citing that there is no requirement that the war-
rantless search occur at the same time as the lawful seizure. '
Justice Brennan, dissenting, argued that this was an unwarranted
extension of Ross" because there were no circumstances that
prevented the officials from obtaining a warrant to search the pack-
ages after the trucks were seized.9
The "automobile exception" has been extended to vehicles other
than automobiles. In United States v. Sigal,9 ' the Tenth Circuit
applied the reasoning of Carroll,8 Chambers," and Cardwell...
to hold that a warrantless search of an airplane is reasonable if
based on probable cause.' The mobility of the plane was a high-
86. id. at 824. The Court further held that when probable cause justifies the search of a vehicle it justifies
the search of every part of the vehicle. Id. at 825.
87. Id. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 830.
90. 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
91. Id. at 480.
92. id. at 483.
93. Id. at 481.
94. Id. at 484. ("[Tihe fact that a container is involved does not in itself either expand or contract the well-
established exception" Id. at 486.)
95. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
96. 469 U.S. at 489 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. 500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 954 (1974).
98. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
99. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
100. 417 U.S. 583 (1974). See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
101. 500 F.2d at 1121.
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ly significant factor to the court in reaching its decision." 2 In
Sigal, federal agents followed an airplane suspected of carrying
marihuana smuggled from Mexico."0 Corroborating evidence con-
firmed their suspicion."0 ' Officials arrested Sigal and searched his
plane. In doing so, they found 445 pounds of marihuana."°' The
court found probable cause and exigent circumstances to uphold
the warrantless search of the airplane.' °
The question of whether a motor home would qualify as a ve-
hicle under the automobile exception was addressed by the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Williams. "7 Border Patrol agents be-
came suspicious of three vehicles travelling together, one of which
was a motor home, believing they might be carrying illegal aliens.
The agents stopped and searched one of the cars. They found items
used in manufacturing PCP.108 Subsequently, all of the occupants
of the vehicles were arrested. Five hours later, the agents searched
the motor home0. and found more items used in PCP manufac-
ture. The occupants, convicted of manufacturing a controlled sub-
stance, appealed alleging that the agents obtained the evidence
unlawfully since no warrant was secured.10 The court refused to
extend the automobile exception to a motor home on two bases.
First, there was no chance that the motor home would be moved
or tampered with before the agents could get a warrant because
all of the occupants were under arrest.111 Second, the expecta-
tions of privacy in a motor home are greater than in a car due
to the fact that people often live in motor homes whereas the same
is not true of automobiles; the windows are often tinted or have
shades so that the public cannot peer in, and the appointments -
beds, bath, etc. -create more of an appearance of a home than
a car.112 The court ultimately upheld the search on the exigent
circumstance that the manufacture of PCP created special dangers
to the public because of its volatility.13
In summary, in order for a warrantless search to be upheld un-
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1120.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1122. See also United States v. Rollins, 699 F.2d 530 (1 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
933 (1983) ("Although these cases may involve automobiles rather than airplanes this court can see no differ-
ence between the exigent circumstances of a car and an airplane."). Id. at 534.
107. 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 865 (1980).
108. Id. at 1323. "PCP" is phencyclidine-a controlled substance. Id.
109. Id. at 1324.
110. Id. at 1323-24.
111. Id. at 1326.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1327. Cf United States v. Gordon, 722 F:2d 112 (5th Cir. 1983)(The court upheld a search
of a motor home based upon the reasonable suspicion that the occupants were engaged in criminal activity.).
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der the automobile exception before Carney, the searching officers
must have had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained
evidence of a crime,11' and the vehicle must have been stopped
in transit."' 5
INSTANT CASE
In applying the automobile exception to motor homes in Califor-
nia v. Carney,16 the Court emphasized the ready mobility of the
motor home, which was one of the original justifications of the
exception." 7 But the Court stressed that this element is important
whether the motor home is on the highway or is "readily capa-
ble" of being used as a vehicle and is not in a place regularly used
for residential purposes."'
The second element upon which the Court relied to justify ex-
tending the exception to include motor homes, was its "lesser ex-
pectation of privacy." 1 9 The Court found this reduced privacy
expectation not in the fact that "the area to be searched is in plain
view, but from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of
traveling on the public highways."120 Homes are not so regulat-
ed. Therefore, the Court reasoned that people have a lesser ex-
pectation of privacy in moving vehicles than in their homes.
Finally, the Court justified its extension of the exception on the
basis that although a motor home is capable of functioning as a
home, it was obvious that in this case it was not being used as
such."1 The Court refused to apply the exception on the basis of
the size of the vehicle or the quality of its appointments, because
application of the exception has historically turned on the "ready
mobility" of the vehicle and on the objective presence that the
vehicle is being used for transportation."'2
After concluding that the exception did apply to the motor home
in this case, the Court discussed the issue of the reasonableness
of the search. The Court held with little discussion that there was
abundant probable cause to search and that the search was one
which a magistrate could authorize; therefore, it was reasonable. 2 '
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, deliv-
ered a lengthy dissent.12' Justice Stevens characterized the motor
114. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
116. 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
117. Id. at 390.
118. Id. at 392.
119. Id. at 391.
120. Id. at 392.
121. Id. at 393-94.
122. id.
123. Id. at 394-95.
124. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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home as a hybrid that placed it somewhere between the privacy
interests of a home which requires a warrant to be searched and
law enforcement interests which supports warrantless searches
of automobiles.125 He outlined three reasons for his dissent. First,
he believed the Court had entered a new area prematurely without
thinking through the consequences. If the California court's deci-
sion had stood, it would have affected only one state. Now, the
decision will affect all fifty states.126 Secondly, the Court, by ex-
tending the exception to motor homes, has given priority to the
exception rather than the rule.127 Finally, Stevens said the majority
had abandoned the limits of the exception by allowing the war-
rantless search of a motor home parked in a lot.' 28 Although he
would uphold a warrantless search of a motor home travelling
on a public highway, he would reach a different result in a case
such as this where it was parked in a lot. He considered the mo-
tor home more like a dwelling with a higher expectation of privacy
than an automobile; therefore, a search of its living quarters
without a warrant was unreasonable."
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The Court is obviously concerned in this case with aiding law
enforcement officials in stopping illegal activity. Indeed, the Court
stated that "to fail to apply the exception to vehicles such as a
motor home ignores the fact that a motor home lends itself easily
to use as an instrument of illicit drug traffic and other illegal ac-
tivity."130 In fact, the seminal case articulating the vehicle excep-
tion involved an automobile used to carry contraband.' Because
a motor home is capable of being used as a dwelling however,
precise guidelines are needed to allow the extension of the au-
tomobile exception to motor homes.
This extension portends new problems for law enforcement offi-
cials. One of these concerns what bearing the place where the
motor home is parked when searched has on the application of
the exception. The Court stated that the exception would apply
when the vehicle is being used on the highways or is capable of
such use and "found stationary in a place not regularly used for
residential purposes - temporary or otherwise." '32 Presumably, the
exception would not apply to motor homes parked on private
125. Id.
126. Id. at 399.
127. Id. at 402-03.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 407-08.
130. Id. at 393.
131. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
132. 471 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added).
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property, trailer parks, or even campgrounds since they can be
temporary residences. But, the problem arises when motor homes
become temporary residences, such as when they are parked for
the night or weekend in recreational areas, beaches, roadside
parks, etc. As a residence, the motor home would have a greater
expectation of privacy; however, these areas are also susceptible
to being used in drug trafficking or other criminal activity, thus
law enforcement interests are also important. A balancing of in-
terests must take place.
A second problem deals with determining the purpose for which
the motor home is being used. The Court said the exception would
apply to vehicles "situated such that it is reasonable to conclude
that the vehicle is not being used as a residence." '3 They listed
some factors in a footnote that might be used in making this
determination- readily movable, elevated on blocks, connected
to utilities, etc."' The problem lies with the fact that when the
motor home is being used as a temporary residence, these objec-
tive factors may not be present. The Court seemed to have im-
plicitly overruled Coolidge v. New Hampshire."' In Coolidge,
the Court refused to extend the exception to the vehicle in ques-
tion. They found that there was probable cause to search the ar-
restee's car but no exigent circumstances to justify searching it
without a warrant as there was no indication that it was about to
be moved." 6 In Carney, however, the Court based its ruling on
the fact that Camey's vehicle was "readily capable" of being moved
even though it was stationary. The Court did make it clear that
this motor home was objectively not being used as a residence,3 7
but neither was Coolidge's car. Are we to assume then, that for
a person's home to be protected by the fourth amendment it must
look like a home to the court?
Finally, the Court left open the question of whether a warrant
must be obtained if it is practical. In United States v. Ross,' 8 the
Court specifically stated that where it is practicable to obtain a
warrant, the officer must do so.' The majority made no men-
tion of this in its opinion in Carney. However, the dissent point-
ed out that, under the circumstances present in Carney, it would
have been easy to obtain a warrant since the motor home was
133. Id. at 393.
134. Id. at 394 n.3.
135. 403 U.S. 443 (1971)(plurality opinion). See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
136. 403 U.S. at 463-64. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
137. 471 U.S. 394. In other words, it is not on blocks or hooked up to an electrical pole.
138. 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text.
139. 456 U.S. at 807. The Court reiterated this requirement found in Carroll. See supra text accompanying
note 15.
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parked in downtown San Diego."" It seems that the exigent cir-
cumstance that the vehicle is fleeting, once required to justify a
warrantless search, is not as important; hence Carney impliedly
overrules Coolidge.'"'
Following Carney, it appears that the only requirement neces-
sary for a vehicle of any type to be searched without a warrant
is that the officer have probable cause to believe the vehicle con-
tains evidence of a crime. No other exigent circumstances are
necessary. This analysis effectively writes out the original justifi-
cation for the exception; that the car might be "quickly moved"' 2
out of the jurisdiction before a warrant could be obtained, neces-
sitating an immediate warrantless search.
It is readily apparent that a balancing is required between an
individual's expectation of privacy (however low) in his vehi-
cle/motor home and law enforcement interests in stopping illegal
activity. As a result, the Supreme Court has received many cases
seeking interpretation of the automobile exception. This places
the Court in the position of what Justice Stevens describes as the
"High Magistrate" for every warrantless search and seizure case.'
The Court's application of the automobile exception to the facts
in Carney appears to be a natural extension of the rule, given that
the motor home in this case was functioning as transportation and
not as a residence. However, given different facts, this motor
home, used for illegal activity, could just as easily have functioned
as Carney's home, carrying with it all the privacy rights of any
other home. Law enforcement officials need more definite guide-
lines in applying the automobile exception to motor homes. The
Court alluded to such guidelines in Carney, but the right to privacy
of the home demands more security than was delivered here."'
C. Joyce Hall
140. 471 U.S. at 403.
141. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 458 (no exigent circumstances existed because there was
no indication the car was fleeting.).
142. See Carrtll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See Supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
143. 471 U.S. at 397.
144. Indeed since the initial writing of this Note, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d
837 (9th Cir. 1986), extended the automobile exception to a motor home parked on private property and con-
nected to electrical utilities. The court's justification for this extension was that the motor home had just been
moved the night before the search; therefore, under Carney it was "readily capable of use on the highways."
Id. at 842-43. The court further states that "[tihe fact that the motor home was attached to 'utilities' in the broad
sense is not very significant." Id.
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